The Armstrong Religious persecution by Scientology, Appeal Brief Part 2
This follows from what showed up on my news reader:
On May 16, 1994 the Court of Appeal, Second District, Division
Four issued its opinion affirming the 5/28/92 preliminary
injunction order. (CT 2040-50) The Court stated:
"We find no abuse of discretion. We cannot say that the
trial court erred as a matter of law in weighing the
hardships or in determining there is a reasonable
probability Church would ultimately prevail to the
limited extent reflected by the terms of the preliminary
injunction." (CT 2048)
"This appeal is only from the granting of a
preliminary injunction which expressly did not decide the
ultimate merits. As limited by the trial court here, the
preliminary injunction merely restrains, for the time
being, Armstrong's voluntary intermeddling in other
litigation against Church, in violation of his own
agreement." (CT 2049)
On June 15, 1994 Scn filed a motion for summary
adjudication of the second and third causes of action of the cross-
complaint. (CT 2080-249) The second cause of action is abuse of
process; the third is breach of contract. On July 20 GA filed his
opposition, (CT 2251-533) and on July 26 Scn filed its reply. (CT
2589-689) On August 16 Judge Horowitz granted Scn's motion for
summary adjudication, ruling as to breach of contract that the SA
did not prohibit Scn from referring to GA in the media, legal
proceedings or declarations. (CT 3019-21)
A hearing was held on Scn's orders to show cause re contempt
before Judge Diane Wayne on July 28, 1994. On July 29 she issued
an order discharging the OSC and GA, ruling that GA's "assistance"
in
Ford Greene's office was permitted "ministerial" conduct, that
providing Wollersheim with a declaration was permissible as
Wollersheim was a defendant in the relevant litigation, and that
GA's 12/22/92 letter did not assist in litigation. (CT 2690-2)
On September 1, 1994, pursuant to stipulation, Armstrong II
was transferred to Marin County. (CT 3023-5) Pursuant to a joint
application for consolidation filed September 12, 1994 (CT 3156-69)
Marin SC Judge Gary W. Thomas consolidated Armstrong II, III and IV
into one case, Marin SC No. 157680. Scn filed an amendment
substituting Solina Behbehani-Walton, Michael Walton's wife, as Doe
2. (CT 3170,1) On January 5, 1995 Mrs. Walton filed her answer.
(CT 3667-71)
On November 16, 1994 Scn filed its motion for summary
adjudication of the fourth, sixth and eleventh causes of action of
plaintiff's second amended complaint. (CT 3172-3665) On January 13
GA filed his opposition. (CT 3875-4076; 4097-4224) The fourth cause
of action concerns GA's providing the Aznarans with a declaration
(CT 3184,5); the sixth concerns GA's giving an interview to CNN TV
and American Lawyer magazine; and the eleventh concerns GA's
providing a declaration to defendants in Scientology v Scott, USDC
No. CV 85-711 JMI and 85-7197 JMI (CT 3185,6). On January 19 GA
filed a supplemental declaration, along with evidence (CT 7400-
504), providing his conviction that what Scn was seeking to prevent
him from saying was religious expression which was above legal
prohibition. (CT 7400-7) Judge Thomas struck the declaration as it
was filed late. On January 20 Scn filed its reply. (CT 4077-96) A
hearing was held January 27. (Reporter's Transcript on Appeal,
hereinafter "RT," V. 1, 1-15)
Judge Thomas granted Scn's summary adjudication motion as to
the fourth and sixth causes of action and denied it as to the
eleventh. In his order he stated in part:
"As to all causes of action, defendant fails to
raise a triable issue as to whether the liquidated
damages provision is invalid. [] The law now presumes
that liquidated damages provisions are "valid unless the
party seeking to invalidate the provision establishes
that the provision was unreasonable under the
circumstances existing at the time the contract was
made." (Civ. Code, Sec. 1671, Subd (b).) Defendant's
evidence is not sufficient to raise a triable issue in
that regard. Although defendant states in his declaration
that he was not involved in negotiating the provision []
he goes on to say that he discussed the provision with
two attorneys before signing the agreement. [] Thus he
clearly knew of the provision yet chose to sign it. He
has not shown that he had unequal bargaining power or
that he made any efforts to bargain or negotiate with
respect to the provision. [] Defendant next states that
plaintiff's actual damages are zero []. However, "The
amount of damages actually suffered has no bearing on the
validity of the liquidated provision.." [] Finally
defendant points to the fact that other settlement
agreements contain a $10,000 liquidated damages
provision. [] This alone is not sufficient to raise a
triable issue that defendant has not shown that
circumstances did not change between 12/86 and 4/87 and
that those settling parties stand in the same or similar
position to defendant (i.e., that they were as high up in
the organization and could cause as much damage by
speaking out against plaintiff or that they have/had
access to as much information as defendant).
"Defendant also has not raised a triable issue
regarding duress. Defendant's own declaration shows that
he did not execute the agreement under duress in that it
shows he carefully weighed his options. It certainly does
not show that he did something against his will or that
he had "no reasonable alternative to succumbing." [cite]
In addition, defendant is relying on the conduct of a
third party (Flynn) to establish duress, yet he sets
forth no fact or evidence in his separate statement
showing that plaintiff had reason to know of the duress.
"Defendant fails to raise a triable issue regarding
obstruction of justice/suppression of evidence. The
settlement agreement expressly does not prohibit
defendant from disclosing information pursuant to
subpoena or other legal process. [cite] Nor is plaintiff
in this cause of action seeking to prohibit disclosure to
government agencies conducting investigations pursuant to
statutory obligations. [cite]. Even if a portion of the
agreement could be construed to so prohibit (see e.g.,
para. 10), plaintiff is not relying on that section. Nor
has defendant shown that the provision is so substantial
as to render the entire contract illegal. [cite]" (Order,
CT 4236-9)
On February 23 Scn filed a motion for summary adjudication of
the twentieth cause of action. (CT 4244-5234) In its twentieth
cause of action Scn sought a permanent injunction prohibiting GA
from violating any provisions of the SA. (CT 1963; Memorandum in
support of motion for summary adjudication, CT 4524.21,2)
On March 17 Scn filed a motion for summary adjudication of
the thirteenth, sixteenth, seventeenth and nineteenth causes of
action. (CT 5298-661) The thirteenth cause of action concerned a
videotape interview GA gave at a CAN conference in 1992 (CT
1951,2); the sixteenth concerned GA's being interviewed by Newsweek
magazine (1953,4); the seventeenth concerned GA's being interviewed
by Entertainment Television; the nineteenth concerned GA's
providing a declaration dated 2/22/94 to be filed in the Scn v.
Fishman case. (CT 1957,8)
On April 19 GA filed a notice Chapter 7 Bankruptcy (USBC, Nor.
Dist. Cal. No. 95-10911) and imposition of automatic stay. (CT
5850-2) On April 21 Judge Thomas stayed the state action. (CT 5853)
Scn brought an adversary proceeding in the Bankruptcy Court
(Scientology v. Armstrong, USBC, Nor. Dist. Cal. No. 95-1164) which
resulted in the stay being lifted. (CT 5855) On September 18 GA
filed his opposition to Scn's motion for summary adjudication of
the twentieth cause of action, and his opposition to the motion for
summary adjudication of the thirteenth, sixteenth, seventeenth, and
nineteenth causes of action. (CT 5871-8553)
On September 20, Scn filed an ex parte application for an
order sealing certain exhibits in GA's evidence, claiming that they
were trade secrets. (CT 8579-8598) GA filed an opposition (CT 8554-
77; 8599-617) Judge Thomas sealed certain of those exhibits pending
the hearing on Scn's motions. (CT 8618,9) On September 25 Scn filed
a reply in support of its summary adjudication motions. (CT 8620-
45) A hearing was held October 6. (RT V. 2, 2-17)
Judge Thomas issued an order granting Scn's motions for
summary adjudication. (CT 8679,80) He stated:
"Invalidity of Liquidated Damages Provision:
Defendant's evidence regarding his attorney's failure to
represent his interests (see facts 43 and 68) is hearsay
and/or not based on personal knowledge. The opinion of
defendant's attorney as to the validity of the provision
(see, e.g., facts 52-54, 57-60) is irrelevant and
hearsay. The fact that two other clients signed a
settlement agreement containing the same liquidated
damages amount (see facts 55-56 and 63-64) does not raise
an inference that the provision was unreasonable.
Defendant's evidence is insufficient to raise a
reasonable inference of unequal bargaining power (No
personal knowledge shown that plaintiff, as opposed to
Flynn, positioned defendant as a "deal breaker"; Flynn's
statements hearsay; no personal knowledge shown of
plaintiff's wealth; wealth alone does not raise inference
of unequal bargaining power since no showing defendant
desperate for money and had to accept on plaintiff's
terms). Defendant's evidence does not raise an inference
that plaintiff's calculation is "unfathomable"
(fourteenth cause of action seeks $50,000 for each of 18
letters; nineteenth cause of action is based only on
declarations, not on other contacts between defendant and
attorney/other clients). Defendant fails to establish how
he knows plaintiff had not been injured by his statements
at the time of the settlement.
Duress: Flynn's statements to defendant are hearsay.
(See, e.g., D's facts 1C and 1D) Further defendant has
now shown that plaintiff was aware of Flynn's purported
duress of defendant. [cite] Contrary to defendant's
statement about duress, "careful weighing of options" is
completely inconsistent with an absence "of free exercise
of his will power" or his having "no reasonable
alternative to succumbing." [cites]
Fraud: Flynn's statements to defendant (See fact 78)
are hearsay. The Court finds that the portions of the
agreement cited by defendant (see facts 79 and 80) do not
establish a mutual confidentiality requirement. Paragraph
7(I) only prohibits the parties from disclosing
information *in litigation between the parties;*
paragraph 18(D) only prohibits disclosure of the terms of
the settlement; defendant has not shown that plaintiff
did either of those things. Further, "something more than
nonperformance is required to prove the defendant's
intention not to perform his promise." [cite]
No Specific Performance,Breach of Express and
Implied Covenant: Defendant relies on the purported
mutuality requirement, which he has failed to establish.
Obstruction of Justice: This argument was rejected
by the Court in connection with plaintiff's first summary
adjudication. (See 2/22/95 Order at para.6.)
First Amendment: First Amendment rights may be
waived by contract. [cite]
On October 17, 1995 Judge Thomas signed Scn's order of permanent
injunction. (CT 8685-93)
On October 26 Scn filed a motion for summary adjudication of
the first cause of action for declaratory relief in GA's cross-
complaint; severance of the fraudulent conveyance claim; dismissal
of unadjudicated breach of contract claims; and entry of final
judgment. (CT 8694-927) On November 17 GA filed his opposition (CT
9218-362), and on November 27 Scn filed its reply. (CT 9453-65)
On November 2 GA filed a motion for reconsideration of the
grant of summary adjudication as to twentieth cause of action for
permanent injunction, (CT 8928-9045) and on November 16 an amended
motion for reconsideration. (CT 9046-217) GA filed under seal his
evidence previously stricken in Judge Thomas's 10/5/95 order. (CT
9218-20) On November 22 Scn filed its opposition to the motion for
reconsideration. (CT 9364-452) On November 29 GA filed his reply.
(CT 9466-519) A hearing was held December 1. (RT V. 2, 18-27)
Judge Thomas issued an order denying GA's motion for
reconsideration, and granting in part Scn's motion for summary
adjudication. (CT 9521,2)
On January 24, Judge Thomas signed an order granting Scn's
motion to sever the fraudulent conveyance action, dismiss the
remaining breach of contract causes of action, enter final
judgment, and adjudicate Scn the prevailing party. (CT 9652-6)
On January 24, 1996 Scn filed a renewal motion for summary
judgment of GA's cross-complaint. (CT 9526-642) On February 23 GA
filed his opposition (CT 9677-772) and on February 26 an amended
opposition. (CT 9749-9778.1) On March 1 Scn filed its reply. (CT
9773-8.1) A hearing was held March 8. (RT V. 1, 26-38) Judge Thomas
issued an order granting Scn's motion for summary judgment on GA's
cross-complaint.(CT 9780)
On May 2, 1996 the Court entered its Judgment. (CT 9783-94)
On July 8, 1996 GA filed his notice of appeal.
III. ARGUMENT
A. There is a Triable Issue as to Duress
In his January 27, 1995 order on Scn's first summary
adjudication motion of certain causes of action of its complaint,
Judge Thomas stated, regarding GA's defense of having signed Scn's
SA because of duress, that GA's own declaration shows that he did
not execute the agreement under duress in that it shows he
carefully weighed his options. Judge Thomas also stated that GA
relied on the conduct of attorney Flynn, a third party, to
establish duress, yet provided no evidence showing that plaintiff
had reason to know of the duress. (CT 4236-9)
In his opposition to Scn's second summary adjudication motion
of its complaint GA provided evidence of Flynn's being fair game
and a target of many Scn attacks from 1979 until the settlement.
(SS 1B, CT 8418-20) In that Scn was the source of the attacks which
included some 15 lawsuits, bar complaints and framing with a check
forgery, it is obvious that Scn knew of at least that aspect of the
duress on Flynn. Scn also knew of all its own acts of fair game
directed at GA up to that time, and at all the other settling
parties. It goes without saying that the purpose of fair game in
its many forms is to apply duress in its many forms to its
designated targets. GA filed as part of his evidence declarations
by several individuals who had knowledge of fair game. (Hana
Whitfield, CT 7780-7887; see, e.g., 7788-91, 7808-27; Dennis
Erlich, CT 7888-99 at 7891; Margery Wakefield, CT 7900-41 at 7903;
Keith Scott, CT 7942-52 at 7945; Malcolm Nothling, CT 7953-9 at
7955, 7958; Jonathon Atack, CT 7960-8038, at 7962-4, 7977-80; Nancy
McLean, CT 8939-49 at 40,1; Lawrence Wollersheim, CT 8052-216 at
8053-59, 8074-212)
That Flynn, GA and the other settling individuals were targets
of fair game is also shown in the "settlement agreement" between
Flynn and his clients, wherein is stated:
"We the undersigned, agree and acknowledge that many
of the cases/clients involved in this settlement...have
been subjected to intense, and prolonged harassment by
the Church of Scientology throughout the litigation...
that [Flynn] or his firm's members have been required to
defend approximately 17 lawsuits and/or civil/criminal
contempt actions instituted by the Church of Scientology
against him, his associates and clients, that he and his
family have been subjected to intense and prolonged
harassment..." (CT 5486,7)
The idea that duress applied by a third party to a person to
get him to sign a document cannot be ascribed to the party seeking
the person's signature is not supported by common sense. If an
agent of a corporation holds a gun to the head of an attorney's
wife, and the attorney tells his client he must sign the
corporation's document or the attorney's wife will be killed,
although the corporate agent doesn't know what the attorney says to
the client, the agent and his corporation are still the source of
and responsible for the duress on the attorney's client. In this
case, the threat of Scn continuing fair game to Flynn, his wife,
family, law firm and clients was the gun held to all their heads.
That Scn was holding its fair game gun to everyone's head was the
communication Flynn relayed to GA to get him to sign Scn's
document.
The nature of the SA itself is also an inference of duress
since what attorney, but one under tremendous duress, would have
his client sign such a document, knowing intimately the history of
fair game by the organization who concocted it. It is clear that
Flynn had, before presenting Scn's SA to GA, already agreed to sign
a contract to not represent or defend GA if GA was attacked in the
future. Such a contract is illegal. What attorney, one as competent
as Flynn, would allow his client to be so exposed and defenseless
to future attacks, except an attorney under duress, or one
thoroughly corrupted. There is too much evidence of duress to
believe that Flynn was just corrupt.
The duress at the time of the settlement, contrary to how it
might be viewed at first glance, is actually demonstrated by Scn's
continuing to fair game GA afterward. Tricking and lying to a
designated target are parts of the basic fair game doctrine. CT
6934; SS 1A, CT 8412) Scn tricked GA into signing its document by
lying about ceasing its attacks. This was acceptable Scn tactics
because GA is designated an SP and hence fair game.
Duress is also evidenced by Flynn's communications to GA
throughout this litigation. Flynn has continually told him that he
would like to help GA but that he is afraid to. Flynn signed a SA
with Scn as well, and has refused to come forward throughout this
litigation, despite telling GA that he "would be there for [him]"
if he had any trouble with Scn after the settlement. (GA
Declaration, 7/20/94 CT 2298) GA filed a declaration executed April
7, 1995 stating what Flynn would testify to if he were released by
Scn from its contract with him. (CT 7678-83) Contracts which limit
an attorney's ability to practice or limit his clients are illegal.
In his order of October 6, Judge Thomas stated again that GA
had not shown that Scn "was aware of Flynn's purported duress of
defendant." (CT 8679) That is not the issue; the issue is Scn's
duress of Flynn, GA and everyone else involved. What Flynn stated
to GA may be hearsay, but what Scn did over its years of attacks on
Flynn and GA, and what it would continue to do if GA didn't sign is
the source of the duress.
Judge Thomas stated that "careful weighing of options" is
completely inconsistent with an absence "of free exercise of [GA's]
will power" or his having "no reasonable alternative to
succumbing." That cannot be true. A person with a gun at his head
may weigh his options just as carefully as a person with free
exercise of his will. His options are, however, radically
different. In this case, GA's options were either sign Scn's
document or have Scn continue to threaten and attack his attorneys,
their families, the 20 other people who wanted out from the threats
and attacks, and himself. Also included in GA's weighing of his
options was Scn's promise through Flynn that it would cease all its
fair game activities against everyone. Flynn's statements to GA
that the SA's prohibitions were not worth the paper they were
printed on and unenforceable, although perhaps ultimately true, are
also reflective of duress, and were also part of GA's weighing of
his options. Some people carefully weigh things; some people don't.
It is the nature of the options being weighed, carefully or not,
which is the true indicator of duress. Judge Thomas did not examine
GA's options. These are options which must be examined by the trier
of fact.
B. There is a Triable Issue as to Fraud
GA has stated throughout this case that he intended to honor
the silence and confidentiality conditions of the SA agreement and
that he understood Scn was to do likewise. (CT 6916) Indeed Scn's
being silent about him, and therefore ceasing to lie about him, was
inherent in Scn's promise to cease all fair game activities, as
relayed by Flynn. Scn has maintained throughout this case that it
may say whatever it wants about GA publicly, and file whatever it
wants in legal proceedings, and is not bound by any agreement to
refrain from such acts. GA only began to speak out about Scn and
his experiences after Scn published and filed false statements
about him and he perceived that Scn was using his silence to
obstruct justice.
In his opposition to Scn's second summary adjudication motion
GA presented considerable evidence of Scn's promise of mutuality as
an inducement to have him settle his cross-complaint. This included
certain parts of the SA, notes of telephone calls from Scn attorney
Lawrence Heller, and a motion and supporting declaration authored
by Heller stating that confidentiality was mutual. (CT 5925-8;
5943,4; Phone notes, CT 6227-37; Transcript, CT 6238,9; CT 5904;
6135-7; CT 6919; CT 6970; CT 5904; SS 105H, 8493,4; SS 103, CT
8490)
In his order granting summary adjudication, Judge Thomas only
commented on two of the SA parts, but did not mention Heller's
telephone statements to GA or Heller's sworn statements. (CT 8680)
Judge Thomas stated that paragraph 18(D) only prohibits disclosure
of the terms of the settlement. But Paragraph 18(E), which he did
not take note of, states: "The parties further agree to forbear and
refrain from doing any act or exercising any right, whether
existing now or in the future, which act or exercise is
inconsistent with this Agreement." (SS 99, CT 8487,8) GA still
believes that this means that Scn must forbear and refrain from
publishing and filing anything about him, other than "stating that
this civil action (Armstrong I) is settled in its entirety." (SA,
18(D), SS 99, CT 8487,8) If GA had understood that Scn's forbearing
and refraining from acts inconsistent with the SA meant that Scn
would publish or file whatever it wanted about him in the future,
he would have, as he has said consistently throughout this case,
never signed. It is clear that the SA was cleverly worded by clever
lawyers, who were more clever than GA.
Judge Thomas also stated that "something more than
nonperformance is required to prove the defendant's intention not
to perform his promise." But GA presented a great deal more to
prove Scn's representation of its intention, and to prove that
there is a triable issue regarding both parties' intention.
In the fall of 1989 attorney Heller threatened GA with
"hassles" if his deposition in the Corydon litigation went forward,
and threatened him with being sued if he testified about his
knowledge even though pursuant to a subpoena. In this conversation
Heller told GA he should honor the SA because Scn had honored it,
and that Scn had signed a non-disclosure agreement as well and had
lived up to it. GA told Heller that Scn had filed declarations
about him, put out dead agent documents on him, and used an illegal
videotape of him. GA's notes of the Heller calls and his recording
of his side of the final conversation support his declaration
containing Heller's comments. (CT 5925-8; 5943,4; Phone notes, CT
6227-37; Transcript, CT 6238,9; CT 5904; 6135-7; CT 6919; CT 6970;
CT 5904; SS 105H, 8493,4; SS 103, CT 8490)
In a motion he filed in Corydon to prevent GA's deposition,
Heller stated:
"One of the key ingredients to completing these
settlements, *insisted upon by all parties involved*, was
strict confidentiality respecting: (1) the Scientology
parishioner or staff member's experiences with the Church
of Scientology; (2) any knowledge possessed by the
Scientology entities concerning those staff members or
parishioners." (Underline in orig.) (SS 102, CT 8489,90;
CT 5998)
In his declaration Heller stated:
"The non-disclosure obligations were a key part of
the settlement agreements insisted upon by all parties
involved." (SS 101, CT 8488,9; CT 6003)
Heller also stated in his declaration:
"The contractual non-disclosure provisions were the
one issue which was not debated by any of the parties or
attorneys involved." (CT 6003)
Heller's statements make absolutely clear Scn's intention of
mutuality as it was promised to GA to get him to sign its contract.
The whole of Scn's litigation to enforce what it now claims is a
non-mutual contract, in order to be able to further fair game GA,
is something far more than mere nonperformance, and far more than
what is required to prove Scn's intention not to perform its
promise.
C. There is a Triable Issue as to Justification
Even, assuming arguendo, that the silence provision only
applied to GA, and that Scn was not required by contract to remain
silent about him, GA was still manifestly justified in speaking out
as soon as Scn did.
Scn claims that it can say whatever it wants, no matter how
false or injurious, and GA cannot respond. That is essentially what
Judge Thomas has ruled in ignoring GA's defense of privilege. GA is
justified in responding to protect his reputation, and indeed his
life. This a matter for the trier of fact to decide and cannot be
dispensed with on summary judgment.
Putting aside defenses and arguments of free speech, freedom
of religion, freedom from slavery, due process and assembly, if Scn
had remained silent about GA, saying no more than that the parties'
litigation was settled in its entirety, and GA had gone public
about his Scn experiences, conceivably Scn could have legally
enforced the SA.
If, on the other hand, Scn had accused GA of being a serial
chain saw murderer; taken out a full page ad or a hundred full page
ads, in the New York Times, in the Washington Post, and in
Newsweek, all accusing him of being a serial chain saw murderer;
bought a satellite, a daily hour on network TV, and produced a show
called "Gerry Armstrong - Serial Chain Saw Murderer," it is
inconceivable that GA could be judicially prevented from responding
in the media, and to anyone who would listen, in order to defend
his reputation; in order to show that he is not a serial chain saw
murderer and to explain what entity is attacking him and why.
Somewhere between GA discussing his Scn experiences without
Scn having said anything about GA, and Scn spending a billion to
run its GA serial chain saw murderer black PR campaign, there is a
line crossed where GA becomes justified in breaching his contract
in order to defend his reputation, and his life. It is the line
Judge Breckenridge recognized in the Armstrong I trial when he said
that in 1982, GA, being the target of fair game, was "privileged to
reveal information confidentially acquired by him in the course of
his agency in the protection of a superior interest of himself or a
third person." (CT 5952) In 1991, GA was no less fair game's
target, and no less privileged to respond to Scn's attacks, even
though his responses might be, absent Scn's attacks, breaches of
contract.
That is a line for the trier of fact, in this case, a jury, to
determine. It is a line involving a look at what a reasonable
person would have done. It is a line involving a set of facts
completely ignored by Judge Thomas in his grant of Scn's summary
judgment. If GA's actions were reasonable, then a contract which
prevents them must be unreasonable. It is indeed unreasonable that
GA who had been fair game would continue to be fair game.
In truth, Scn's post-settlement attacks on GA are more
vilifying, and call for a different, more complete response, than
does a libel like GA being a serial chainsaw murderer. Scn gives
its black PR titles like "False Report Correction," (CT 7598, 7612)
makes it look authoritative by providing many "facts," (CT 7514,5)
or presents it in the form of a sworn affidavit. (CT 6068) Scn's
statements about GA are black PR going beyond his Scn experiences;
e.g., claiming falsely that he posed nude in a newspaper (CT 7514;
7524) or, also falsely, that he has AIDS. (CT 8242; 8676,7) These
are matters to be examined by the jury to determining if GA acted
reasonably in responding as he did, and whether first of all Scn
crossed over the line.
Sadly, there is sometimes an assumption of guilt in the public
mind when a charge is not responded to. There can be little doubt
that Scn would use GA's failure to respond to its calumnies to
further amplify the illusion of his guilt it manufactured in that
public mind. No one can be compelled to respond to false charges
made to the public, and it is the most courageous man who does not
respond. But no one also can be prevented by human agency from
responding to falsehoods, definitely not by our Courts. GA has been
moved to respond, no matter how uncourageous or dangerous
responding might be, so that this terrible injustice can be seen
and stopped, and perhaps stopped from happening to others.
D. The Settlement Agreement Obstructs Justice
In his order granting Scn's first motion for summary
adjudication Judge Thomas stated that there was no triable issue
regarding obstruction of justice/suppression of evidence because
the SA does not prohibit GA from disclosing information pursuant to
subpoena or other legal process. (CT 4237) But the fact that the SA
allows GA to testify pursuant to subpoena does not automatically
mean that the SA does not have as its object obstruction of
evidence. The facts of GA's relationship with Scn and other
litigants, particularly Scn's litigant victims (see, e.g., CT
5486,7), and the facts of the uses to which Scn put the SA are
essential to determining whether it obstructed justice. Thus an
examination by the trier of fact is necessary.
Although instances of the SA acting to obstruct justice
abound, one will serve to show that obstruction is its object. On
February 8, 1994 Scientology leader David Miscavige, filed in the
Scientology v. Fishman case, supra, a declaration (CT 7625.1-65) in
which he attacked GA, claiming, inter alia, that GA advised people
to falsely accuse Scn of criminal acts, that the IRS repudiated
GA's credibility, and that in a police-sanctioned investigation GA
acknowledged his motives were to overthrow Scn leadership and gain
control. (CT 7655,6) On February 22, 1994 GA executed a declaration
correcting the falsehoods in Miscavige's declaration. GA's
declaration was filed in Fishman March 9, 1994 as part of
defendants' pending motion for costs. (CT 5579; 5646) GA appended
to his declaration as an exhibit a public announcement by then LAPD
Chief Daryl Gates that the "authorization" given to Scn agent
Eugene Ingram by police officer Phillip Rodriguez to eavesdrop upon
or record the confidential communications of GA or attorney Flynn
(CT 5641) was invalid and unauthorized and not a correspondence
from the LAPD. (CT 5643)
It would have been obstructive of the justice the Fishman
defendants were due if GA had not responded and Miscavige's lies
about him had adversely influenced the Judge in the case. That is
exactly what Scn sought with its SA and its judicial enforcement.
It would also have been obstructive of the justice GA was due in
the Fishman case, which is enshrined in the litigant's privilege.
(See opposition to motion for summary adjudication, CT 3886-92) It
would be obstructive of the justice GA is due and every party in
all Courts of California and the United States are due if Scn can
lie when it wants about him and prevent him from responding to
correct its sworn to lies. Since the SA's purpose is to silence GA
so that Scn can say whatever it wants about him, his credibility,
litigation, testimony and character with impunity, including in
legal proceedings, it is obstructive of justice.
There was no opportunity for the Fishman defendants to
subpoena GA for his testimony to refute Miscavige's charges.
Discovery was closed, and in fact the case had been dismissed, as
can be seen by the fact that GA's declaration concerned defendants'
motion for costs. There are many instances in litigation where
there is neither time nor legal opportunity to take someone's
deposition to obtain testimony to present needed information or
refute presented misinformation. Additionally, requiring one party
in litigation to obtain third party testimony by deposition that he
is prevented from obtaining by declaration only by the opponent's
"contracts," senselessly, but dramatically, runs up litigation
costs. That is one of Scn's tactics and is in itself obstruction of
justice.
Judge Thomas also stated in his January 27, 1995 order that,
since Scn was not seeking in the causes of action on which it then
sought summary adjudication to prohibit disclosure to government
agencies conducting investigations pursuant to statutory
obligations, GA had not raised a triable issue regarding
obstruction of justice. He went on to state that "even if a portion
of the agreement could be construed to so prohibit (see e.g.,
para.10), plaintiff is not relying on that section, nor and has
defendant shown that the provision is so substantial as to render
the entire contract illegal."(CT 4236-9) But that paragraph
certainly is indicative of the overall object of the SA being the
obstructive of justice, and thus having an illegal objective. The
SA is very clear about assistance to government agencies:
"[GA] agrees that he will not assist or advise anyone,
including individuals, partnerships, associations,
corporations, or governmental agencies contemplating any
claim or engaged in any litigation or involved in or
contemplating any activity adverse to the interests of
any entity or class of person (the beneficiaries)"
The fact that the non-assistance to governmental agencies was
itself illegal is evidenced by Judge Thomas's permanent injunction
which expressly excludes "government organ[s] or entit[ies]" from
its prohibitions. If the prohibiting of assistance to government
entities is obstructive of justice and illegal, is not the
prohibiting of assistance to non-government entities equally as
obstructive and equally as illegal? Non-government entities are
equally due justice, perhaps even more due justice than the
government entities, whose responsibility it is to provide justice.
The purpose of the SA is to tilt the legal playing field in
Scn's favor. This should be declared illegal. For justice to be
obstructed it is not necessary to obstruct the whole justice
system. For justice to be obstructed it is enough for one side to
use any obstruction to gain an unfair advantage. The SA certainly
gains Scn an unfair advantage over GA, and there is much evidence
that the SA gives Scn an unfair advantage over all its litigant
adversaries. (See, e.g., Long affidavits filed in Scn v. Miller,
supra., CT 6011-102) Adding into the legal arena the other SAs
signed by the other settling litigants in December, 1986, including
attorneys, the obstruction becomes gargantuan.
The obstruction of justice inherent in the SA is compounded by
its judicial enforcement. Because GA filed his declaration in
Fishman, as, pursuant to the litigant's [absolute] privilege, he
should have, to correct Miscavige's lies, Scn added the declaration
as a cause of action in its complaint, and ultimately was awarded
$50,000 in liquidated damages. (CT 5312,3; 8679)
The SA's obstruction of justice is also compounded by Scn's
proclivity for attempting its enforcement and using it as a threat
in a scope even beyond its already obstructive language. Scn
brought contempt of court charges against GA for 10 alleged
violations of the preliminary injunction issued May 28, 1992 by
Judge Sohigian. (CT 0428-639) These contempts were discharged July
29, 1994. (CT 2690-2) Before he responded to Scn's attacks GA was
threatened by Scn attorney Heller who said that GA could be sued if
he testified, even though he had been subpoenaed in the Corydon
case, and that to prevent his being sued GA should refuse to answer
Corydon's attorney's questions. (CT 5926-8) The trier of fact in
determining whether the SA's object is to obstruct justice must
look at the nature of the entity using it and that entity's
intentions. Judge Thomas did not do this.
GA again argued that the SA obstructs justice in his
opposition to Scn's second summary adjudication motion. (CT 8270,1)
Judge Thomas commented merely that the argument had been rejected
with Scn's first summary adjudication. (CT 8679)
In his separate statement GA included a statement in a
declaration by Scn member Long that prior to December, 1986 GA had
testified in 15 cases a total of 28 trial days, had been deposed
for 19 days, and had executed 28 declarations in 15 cases all of
which concerned Scn. (SS 135, CT 8520; Long Declaration, CT 7742)
The Court of Appeal in denying GA's appeal from the 5/28/92
injunction stated that it merely restrains, for the time being,
GA's "voluntary intermeddling" in other litigation against Scn. (CT
2049) GA has never intermeddled in those litigations. His testimony
and assistance has been sought by the parties in those cases.
Nothling called him from South Africa (See, e.g., CT 7004); Yanny
called him from Los Angeles (See, e.g., CT 7004); Corydon
subpoenaed him (CT 5990-4); Fishman's attorney put GA on his expert
witness list; Miscavige involved him by filing a false sworn
declaration. (CT 7655,6)
The answer to Scn's problem with GA's testimony, and with
anyone's testimony, concerning the discreditable facts about its
nature and activities is not to attempt to suppress or prohibit
that testimony with its illegal SA and to punish GA, or anyone, for
testifying. Scn's answer, if it wishes to escape liability, is to
remove those discreditable facts from its nature and activities so
that there is nothing to be held liable for. When Scn does so,
GA's, and anyone's, testimony regarding discreditable facts will no
longer be relevant and will no longer be sought.
Indeed it is the vital corrective or reformative function of
the justice system which Scn seeks to avoid or obstruct with its
dependence on its SAs and their enforcement. It is not in the
public interest that the justice system lose its power to bring
about correction and reform by enforcing obstructive contracts
which suppress knowledge of matters truly needing correction and
reform. As Judge Geernaert said when Scn urged him to enforce the
same SA Judge Thomas has enforced:
"I know we like to settle cases. But we don't like
to settle cases and, in effect, prostrate the court
system into making an order which is not fair or in the
public interest." (CT 7700)
Scn seeks to prostrate the court system. The system, on which
everyone depends to prevent injustice, must let Scn, and everyone,
know that it is not for sale and will not be prostrated for any
amount of money.
It would be obstructive of justice to prevent perceived
obstruction of justice from being reported. If a Court failed to
acknowledge obstruction of justice as obstructive it would be
obstructive to prevent that fact from being reported. If the court
system failed to acknowledge obstruction of justice as obstructive
it would be obstructive to prevent any of those facts from being
reported to the media, to government and to anyone who would
listen. That is the situation here. The reporting of obstruction of
justice cannot be obstructed. The reporting of perceived
obstruction of justice, or any other crime, cannot be prohibited
until such time as the obstruction or other crime is proven. GA has
been unshakable in his conviction that the SA and Scn's enforcement
are obstructive of justice since he first petitioned the Court of
Appeal for permission to respond in the Armstrong I appeal in 1990.
(CT 6119-21) He continues to make the argument the moment these
words are typed. His argument is not without merit. For that reason
alone he cannot be silenced by the obstructive SA, nor by the Marin
Court's enforcement, and it is enough reason for this Court to rule
that there is a triable issue regarding that obstruction.
E. There is a Triable Issue as to the Validity of the Liquidated
Damages Provision
Judge Thomas stated in his January 27, 1995 order that GA had
failed to raise a triable issue as to whether the liquidated
damages provision is invalid, and that, quoting Civ. Code, §1671,
Subd (b), the law presumes that liquidated damages provisions are
"valid unless the party seeking to invalidate the provision
establishes that the provision was unreasonable under the
circumstances existing at the time the contract was made." Judge
Thomas stated that, although GA states that he was not involved in
negotiating the provision, GA goes on to say that he discussed the
provision with two attorneys before signing the agreement. Judge
Thomas stated that GA clearly knew of the provision yet chose to
sign it, and that GA had not shown that he had unequal bargaining
power, or that he made any efforts to bargain or negotiate with
respect to the provision. Judge Thomas stated that GA pointed to
the fact that other SAs (the Aznarans') contain a $10,000
liquidated damages provision, but that this alone was not
sufficient to raise a triable issue that GA did not show that
circumstances did not change between 12/86 and 4/87 and that the
Aznarans stood in the same or similar position to GA. Judge Thomas
described the same or similar position as being as high up in the
organization and able to cause as much damage by speaking out
against Scn, or having access to as much information as GA.
It is up to the trier of fact to decide what all the
circumstances were at the time the SA was presented to GA for
signing and whether the liquidated damages provision was
unreasonable under those circumstances. The circumstances at the
time and leading up to that time were complex, and involved many
people and many complex legal and personal relationships. GA
presented more than sufficient evidence to raise a question
concerning the unreasonableness of the liquidated damages, and
Judge Thomas erred in his grant of summary adjudication.
In his opposition to Scn's second summary adjudication motion
GA again argued the unenforceability of the liquidated damages
provision. (CT 8244-50; SS 41-88, CT 8324-40) GA provided the
deposition testimony of two Flynn "clients," Nancy Rodes and
Michael Douglas, both of whom signed similar SAs to that signed by
GA. Each of their SAs contained a $50,000 liquidated damages
provision. Rodes and Douglas each were paid $7,500 to settle their
claims. (SS 55,6, CT 8329,30; SS 63,4, CT 8331,2; Deposition
transcript of Michael Douglas, CT 7702-10; Deposition transcript of
Nancy Rodes, CT 7716; "Mutual Release Agreement," CT 7732-40) Rodes
testified that she had been told by Flynn that the "settlement
agreement" is "not really enforceable...no legal document can
really take away your rights." She testified that in her decision
to sign she relied "to a fairly large extent" on Flynn's telling
her that he thought the provisions with respect to maintaining
silence were not enforceable. (SS 57-60, CT 7726)
GA provided his own testimony that the liquidated damages
provision was unreasonable at the time because it applied to over
seventeen years of his life, about which it was impossible for him
to be silent. On its face the SA did not permit GA to communicate
his experiences to a doctor, lawyer, girlfriend, counselor,
minister, or any agency of the government; or face a $50,000
penalty. (SS 44, CT 8325; 8218) Scn was not intending to honor its
promise to cease fair game but was intending to subject GA and his
friends to more attacks including publishing its own untrue and
perverse accounts of his history. (SS 45, CT 8326; 8218,9) Scn's
intention is shown by the fact that immediately after the
settlement it provided its account of GA's history and documents
concerning him to at least the Los Angeles Times, and shortly
thereafter to at least the London Sunday Times. (SS 46, CT 8326;
8218) Since Scn knew that it was going to continue to fair game GA
after the settlement, continue the public controversy, and very
possibly draw GA into that controversy in order to defend his
reputation, it was patently unreasonable to require of him a
$50,000 per utterance liquidated damages provision in Scn's SA.
GA testified that the unreasonableness of the liquidated
damages provision is clearly demonstrated by the way Flynn dealt
with it. When GA protested the provision and the impossibility of
being silent about his seventeen years of experiences, Flynn said,
"It's not worth the paper it's printed on;" "it's unenforceable."
Flynn also said that "[Scn] won't change it." For that reason and
that reason alone there was no discussion of the liquidated damages
provision beyond that point. (SS 52, CT 8328; 8219-20) GA saw the
liquidated damages provision at the time of the settlement as
stupid, cruel and diabolic. Flynn said "It's not worth the paper
it's printed on;" but "[Scn] won't change it." Armstrong was left
with only one option: if Scn wants to keep the stupid, cruel and
diabolic provision in its unenforceable SA, so be it. (SS 53, CT
8328,9; 8220)
GA testified that Scn had not been damaged in any way
monetarily by any statement he had made at any time prior to the
settlement; that there was no relationship between actual damages
sustained by Scn and the amount of the liquidated damages; that all
the money Scn spent on litigation concerning GA has been to further
its fair game goals in violation of his basic human and civil
rights, not on repairing damage he has done. (SS 49-51, CT 8327,8;
8219)
GA testified that he had an utterly unequal bargaining power
at the time of the settlement and yet made a sincere effort to
address the provision and negotiate, only to be told by Flynn "it's
not worth the paper it's printed on. GA was positioned by Flynn and
Scn as a "deal breaker." He was flown to Los Angeles from Boston
without seeing one word of the SA, and after Flynn's other clients
had been brought to Los Angeles. He was told by Flynn that Scn
would continue to subject GA, all Flynn's clients, and Flynn
himself to fair game unless GA signed. (SS 67,8, CT 8335,6; 8220,1)
GA testified that Scn had millions of dollars, a formidable
litigation machine in place and operating, and GA's own attorney
intimidated and compromised. (SS 71, CT 8337; 8221) Flynn's co-
counsel in GA's case, Julia Dragojevic, was not representing his
interests, but was going along with whatever deal Flynn obtained
from Scn. (SS 70, CT 8446, 8221)
Flynn's statement that "it's not worth the paper it's printed
on" was not a shock to GA because he had been required to sign
similar "non-disclosure" documents with liquidated damages
provisions while inside Scn, and Flynn had stated many times to him
that such documents were "not worth the paper they were printed
on." These documents were also found to be unenforceable by the
Court in Armstrong I. (SS 73, CT 8337,8; 8221; CT 6030)
If Flynn had stated or even implied at the 1986 settlement
that the liquidated damages provision was valid and enforceable GA
would never have signed. (SS 74, CT 8338; 8221) It is ironic that,
although Flynn did not properly represent GA's interests, and in
fact succumbed to the point of acting as Scn's agent, he was
truthful in his representation that the liquidated damages
provision was not worth the paper was printed on. It still isn't.
In his October 6 order granting Scn summary adjudication Judge
Thomas stated regarding the liquidated damages provision that GA's
evidence regarding Flynn's failure to represent him was not based
on person knowledge. (CT 8679) GA's evidence of Flynn's failure to
represent him was of course based on person knowledge. GA was
there, spoke with Flynn, and had many personal dealings with Flynn
before and after the settlement. GA was the client, and Flynn's
employee. Flynn's non-representation is also evidenced by the SA
itself, and his signing side deals with Scn.
Judge Thomas stated that GA's evidence did not raise a
reasonable inference of unequal bargaining power, and that he had
no personal knowledge of Scn's wealth. (CT 8679) But GA did have
personal knowledge of Scn and its wealth and power, having been
inside for over twelve years, much of that near the organization's
top. He also had personal knowledge of its litigation machine and
fair game, from his intelligence position inside Scn, because he
was himself a fair game target, and because he had worked with
Flynn in the Scn litigation.
Judge Thomas also stated that Rodes' and Douglas's signing SAs
with the same liquidated damages amount as GA did not raise an
inference that the provision was unreasonable. (CT 8679) But the
Rodes and Douglas SAs do raise an inference of unreasonability.
They were paid $7,500 and yet had the same liquidated damages
figure in their SAs, $50,000 per utterance. Rodes, like GA, was
told by Flynn that the provision was unenforceable. Scn makes much
of GA's being paid over $500,000 to settle his case. In truth it is
irrelevant what Scn paid GA to settle his cross-complaint, or for
anything else. It did not know what it was paying him since the
amount of the settlement was confidential between Flynn and his
clients. (CT 117,8) The issue is whether the liquidated damages
provision was unreasonable if GA had been paid $0. Did the fact
that GA was paid $500,000 mean that his cross-complaint was valued
at $492,500 and his silence was worth $7,500? Or did it mean that
GA knew 65 times as many discreditable things about Scn as Rodes
and Douglas?
In his January 27, 1995 order Judge Thomas had stated that the
disparity between the Aznarans' liquidated damages of $10,000 and
GA's of $50,000 had to do with changing circumstances between 12/86
and 4/87, or how high up in the organization they were relative to
GA, or whether they were able to able to cause as much damage by
speaking out against Scn, or had access to as much information as
he did. (CT 4236) The only fact that is absolutely clear when
examining the 6 documents containing liquidated damages provisions
filed in this case is that there is a triable issue regarding the
circumstances at the time of GA signing of the subject SA
containing the liquidated damages provision, and consequently a
triable issue regarding its validity.
F. The Settlement Agreement Violates Freedom of Speech
In his opposition to Scn's motion for summary adjudication of
its twentieth cause of action, GA argued that what Scn sought with
its SA and its enforcement was to impermissibly prohibit his
Constitutionally guaranteed First Amendment rights. (CT 8272,3)
Judge Thomas's ruling on GA's presented defense was incredibly
clipped: "First Amendment: First Amendment rights may be waived by
contract. (See ITT Telecom Products Corp. v. Dooley (1989)214
Cal.App.3d 307, 319.)" (CT 8680)
But Dooley concerns an employee's agreement not to disclose
confidential information. It is not at all similar to the situation
in this case. None of the information GA possessed was
confidential. Indeed, Judge Breckenridge stated in his decision,
affirmed on appeal:
"[GA] and his counsel are free to speak or communicate
upon any of [GA's} recollections or his life as a
Scientologist or the contents of any exhibit received in
evidence or marked for identification and not
specifically ordered sealed." (CT 5950)
The Court of Appeal which affirmed the decision also refused Scn's
effort to have the record on appeal sealed. (CT 6903) All of what
GA has to say is already a matter of public record, and in no way
confidential to anyone.
This case is different from Dooley because it involves, not
confidential information learned on a job, but GA's experiences,
now over a 28 year period, with an organization which has subjected
him, and continues to subject him, to the nightmare that goes by
the name fair game. This case is profoundly different from Dooley
because it involves the unthinkable concept of Scn being able to
say whatever it wants about GA, in exercise of its free speech
right and in furtherance of its fair game doctrine, while he may
not exercise his free speech right to defend himself. Pursuant to
the SA and the permanent injunction, every Scientologist, every Scn
lawyer and every Scn agent can say whatever they want about GA and
he may not respond. Dooley does not support such an obnoxious idea.
That "First Amendment [free speech] rights may be waived by
contract" does not mean that all free speech rights may be waived
by contract. As with all contracts, a contract waiving the very
basic right of free speech must be reasonable, and must be legal.
There is a limit, and that is a limit to be decided by the trier of
fact, not hidden away with the gloss that first amendment rights
may be waived by contract.
Could the US require, in order to settle a case, that a person
never again mention this great nation? Unless of course subpoenaed?
Could California require to settle a case, or for any reason, that
a person never again mention this great state? Or rather, would any
court consider enforcing such "contracts?"
Could a court enforce a contract requiring that a person not
discuss the Republicans? The Democrats? The Communists? Politics?
Would any court entertain a lawsuit to collect on a $50,000
liquidated damages provision in such a contract? If free speech
rights can be waived by contract, could a court enforce a contract
someone signed, perhaps because his attorney told him it was not
worth the paper it was printed on, in which he agreed to not speak
at all, about anything?
No. There must be a limit to what speech can be contracted
away. Here, GA has been sued 5 times, driven into bankruptcy,
driven from his job, black PRed and pilloried. The purpose of the
First Amendment guarantee of free speech is to provide a defense
for all citizens from such things, and indeed to prevent them from
happening.
It is perhaps acceptable that Scn pays people, or even
contracts with them for their silence. It is, however, completely
unacceptable and impermissible for our Courts to enforce such
contracts. When Courts cease such enforcement, Scn will perhaps
cease its determination to silence people and its determination to
rewrite history. The people will then get what they are owed in
order to make informed choices which is their due: the free flow of
truthful information.
G. The Settlement Agreement Violates the Thirteenth Amendment
Slavery is a state in which the slave is subject to a master
and does not have the recourse to defenses available to free men.
GA is subject to Scn's fair game abuse and pursuant to the SA, and
now the permanent injunction, GA may not respond. Scn and the Marin
Court have acted to dispossess GA of the right to defend himself
that free men possess. Scn is using the Courts to make and keep GA
its punching bag and slave.
The Thirteenth Amendment made slavery illegal in the United
States. At the end of the twentieth century, clever lawyers in the
employ of an entity that would enslave people, have found a way to
reinstitute it. Psychological peonage is still peonage. Attorney
Flynn did not have the legal right to sell GA into slavery, and Scn
does not have the legal right to keep him there. The SA and all
such "contracts" should be seen for the instruments of slavery they
are, and struck down summarily.
H. The Settlement Agreement Violates Freedom of Religion
Scn claims to be a religion, and claims all the extraordinary
benefits conferred by the Constitution on religions. It claims that
it is organized solely for religious purposes and that its policies
and bulletins are "scriptures." (SS 138-143, CT 8522-4; revised by-
laws, CT 7746, 7748,9)
It is axiomatic that there is no freedom of religion where
there is no freedom to criticize, oppose or reform religion. The
US was founded in great part by people fleeing "religious
persecution" for opposing, criticizing or seeking to reform a
religion which had the power, often provided by the State, to
persecute them. The US recognized the need for its citizens to be
free from religious persecution in the Religious Expression and
Religious Establishment Clauses in the First Amendment to the
Constitution.
Religious expression in the US has traditionally only been
limited by an overriding State interest or need; e.g., to maintain
peace, safety or morality. It is not permitted to destroy a fellow
citizen as an expression of one's religion. It is not permitted
religious expression to yell "hell fire" in a crowded theater. It
is not permitted to enter private property, to wiretap, to steal,
or to commit fraud, although called for in one's religious
"scriptures."
The prohibition against the State's establishment of a
religion has traditionally been interpreted to mean that no
religion will be favored or given more support by government than
any other religion. Christianity and Christians, Buddhism and
Buddhists, and Scientology and Scientologists will be treated by
government and all its branches in every way equally. Also anti-
christians, anti-buddhists and anti-scientologists will be treated
in every way equally.
With its SAs Scn is attempting to suppress and eliminate
criticism; as well as opposition and reformation efforts. Any
court's enforcement of Scn's SA necessarily involves the State in
one religion's suppression and elimination of criticism. Judicial
enforcement also results in the promotion and establishment of Scn
by the removal of opposition to promotion and establishment. Unless
the State is also willing to become involved in and support every
other religion's suppression or elimination of criticism, it may
not assist Scn in its campaign.
It is, however, inconceivable that any US Court would
prosecute someone who under any circumstances signed a contract
which required that he not discuss God, Jesus Christ, the Holy
Bible, or his experiences in the Christian religion; or for that
matter Allah, Islam, Mohammed, the Koran, the Vedas, Krishna, or
Xenu. Scn must learn that no Court will or may prosecute someone
for breaking one of its unholy contracts which requires that he not
discuss L. Ron Hubbard, Scn, Scientologists, Scn scriptures and the
person's experiences in that religion.
It is inconceivable that a Christian church in the US would do
what Scn has done to silence its critics. But even Christianity,
although it would never silence anyone about itself, must not be
given the opportunity. Therefore Scn's efforts to silence its
critics and prevent discussion of itself must not be given judicial
support. Its SAs must be ruled to be judicially unenforceable.
The acceptance of criticism, opposition and calls for reform
must be the natural balance to the extraordinary benefits conferred
on religions. Scn chose to call itself a religion, and, when it did
so, in this country, it also had to accept its critics' freedom to
criticize it without State intervention.
Scn's SA impermissibly creates a religious discrimination by
prohibiting GA from assisting anyone adverse to its, a religion's,
interests. If such a contractual, and now judicially enforced,
prohibition of help is legal along religious lines, it could be
equally as legal along racial lines, or political, or sexual. But
no court would consider enforcing a contract which required non-
assistance to Chinese people, Conservatives, or women. No court
should also consider enforcing Scn's contract.
It is abundantly clear in the reading of the complete record
(and GA prays that this Court will take the time to do so) that GA
has believed throughout this litigation in the existence of God.
(See, e.g., GA 6/21/91 letter, CT 7482-98) It clear that he has
come to believe that his being involved in this case, and indeed
all of his persecution by Scn, is for God's Purpose. (See, e.g., SS
146-156, CT 8525-39; 5894-923) It is also clear that he sees fair
game as a terrible evil, and sees Scn's SAs and their enforcement
as part of that evil.
The Holy Bible is certainly clear that God is intimately
involved with man, religion and justice. He sends His prophets to
decry injustice. The Court cannot say that GA is not guided by God.
If GA had done something to disturb the peace or threaten public
safety, the State can act against him. But here there is no
question of peace, safety or morality; there is only a person
speaking out to decry injustice, to decry what he sees as a real
threat to peace, safety and morality. There is only a person
speaking his thoughts. No US Court can say these are not God's
thoughts. GA's words are religious expression about a religion, and
they must be left completely free of State control.
By the direction of God or not this Court has the opportunity
to do a great work and eliminate a great evil. It is great not
because GA is great, but because the freedom of every person to
freely express his conscience, freely tell the truth and freely
help any of his fellows is great.
IV. CONCLUSION
Nothing calls out for the enforcement of Scn's SA but the
voice of vindictiveness. Justice calls out for nonenforcement. GA
performed fairly; he dismissed his suit and gave Scientology the
criticism-free opportunity it said it wanted in order to reform.
Scn says it paid for peace. But there is no peace if one side
continues to be attacked. Scn performed unfairly. It still has the
opportunity to reform and embrace fairness. GA asks this Court to
reject the Judgment in this case and do Justice to bring
Scientology to take this opportunity.
Respectfully submitted,
Dated August 25, 1997
Gerald Armstrong
A
